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Technical Controversy and Ballistic Missile Defence: Disputing Epistemic 
Authority in the Development of Hit-to-kill Technology  
Abstract 
 
Public debate about Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) has long centred on the 
question of feasibility, particularly as regards the realism of testing. Thus BMD 
opponents have argued that flight-tests are insufficiently similar to operational 
use to provide a reliable guide to real-world performance. However, an in-depth 
account of the development of US hit-to-kill technology – an approach to BMD 
that relies on the direct impact of an interceptor on the enemy missile warhead - 
reveals a far less-recognized issue: some BMD supporters have specific 
technical doubts which centre on the design of the current system rather than on 
its testing. These concerns hinge on contrasting claims to epistemic authority 
between two camps of BMD supporters. On the one hand, advocates of space-
based BMD oppose the current system on in-principle conceptual grounds. On 
the other hand, some BMD supporters close to the development of ground-based 
hit-to-kill technology claim that the empirical evidence from testing shows that the 
current design is suboptimal because it is the outcome of bureaucratic politics 
compromise between the two camps. Although the battle for epistemic authority 
has swung in favour of the latter hit-to-kill supporters recently, the lack of 
operational experience with a defence against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles 
means that further disputes are likely. So long as empirical knowledge claims 
rest solely on testing, they are unlikely to prove sufficiently politically compelling 
to silence advocates of space-based defence. 
 
 
Key words: Missile defence, testing, military technology 
Introduction 
At 7.02 pacific daylight time on October 2, 1999 a Minuteman Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
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California. Heading west, the missile released a mock warhead and a decoy 
balloon made of a reflective synthetic material.  About twenty minutes later 
another Minuteman, this time carrying a homing interceptor known as the exo-
atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), was launched from the US missile range at 
Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, 4300 miles west of the California coast. 
Another ten minutes later, 3,000 miles from California and 140 miles above the 
ocean, the kill vehicle achieved a direct hit on the target. With a closing speed of 
16,000 miles an hour, the impact was apparently decisive. According to a 
spokesman for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, ‘the flash from the 
impact was spectacular’ and the target was ‘totally pulverised’ (Stevenson, 
1999).1 
 
Such a successful interception in a flight-test was an impressive achievement, 
but it left many questioning whether this hit-to-kill ballistic missile defence (BMD) 
technology would work in operational use (I will also refer to this as real-world 
use).2 One success did not mean the system was reliable, and in fact the next 
two tests would be failures, as would a significant number over the following 
decade. In addition to concerns about reliability, critics expressed more 
fundamental doubts about whether even a series of successful tests provides 
convincing evidence about operational performance. 
 
The main such critique came from opponents of BMD with the Union of 
Concerned Scientists (UCS) arguing that these flight-tests were ‘not conducted 
under operationally-realistic conditions’ (Gronlund et al, 2001, p. 14). In 
                                                 
1 This account is based on Graham (2001), pp. 187-88; Stevenson (1999); Rick Lloyd, 
‘National Missile Defense – IEC was there!’, 
http://www.iechome.com/news/110099.htm, accessed 30/1/08. 
2  It appears that the intercept was fortunate as the kill vehicle had drifted off target and 
only recovered by locking on to the balloon decoy which happened to be close to the 
target. See Dao (2001). 
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particular, these critics contended that the flight-tests were insufficiently 
challenging because they did not take account of likely enemy countermeasures 
(Sessler et al, 2000). Such criticism from longstanding opponents of BMD 
deployment is not surprising. However, as this paper will describe, doubts about 
the feasibility of this hit-to-kill technology are not restricted to BMD opponents, 
and the debate about feasibility hinges on more than just concern over the 
credibility of flight-tests.  
 
Controversy over technical feasibility has long been at the heart of debates about 
BMD (although it is not the only concern with many opponents also arguing that 
deployment would be undesirable) and has been a persistent issue despite 
decades of development. However, this topic has attracted little attention from 
STS scholars (a notable exception is Slayton, 2003). There are many studies of 
the politics of BMD technology (recent examples include Peoples, 2009; a classic 
study is Yanarella, 1977), but these make little attempt to open the black box. 
 
The aim here is to address this gap in our understanding of the debate over BMD 
feasibility through a detailed historical case study describing the development of 
hit-to-kill technology. What role has testing played in providing evidence of the 
potential success of BMD, and why - despite decades of development - have test 
results failed to convince critics of BMD feasibility? Why have the fortunes of hit-
to-kill technology fluctuated over the years? And why is it that some BMD 
supporters are critical of the hit-to-kill Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 
deployed by the administration of G. W. Bush (and continued under Obama)?  
 
Testing, Missile Defence, and Knowledge Claims 
 
Testing plays an important role in the development of many technologies, and is 
a key source of knowledge about performance (MacKenzie, 1989; Pinch, 1993; 
Downer, 2007). Flight-testing has been central to debates about the feasibility of 
BMD technology because it is seen as providing the empirical feedback that is 
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closest to actual use. This matters because BMD technology has had little 
operational experience (the exception being the use of short-range Patriot 
systems against non-nuclear threats in the two Gulf conflicts in 1991 and 2003). 
 
Public controversy over the flight-testing of hit-to-kill technology (eg Gronlund et 
al, 2004) has focussed on two main concerns: that the flight-tests have not been 
successful enough to justify a decision to deploy such a BMD system, and that 
even successful tests (i.e. ones in which a direct hit on the target has apparently 
been achieved) do not provide satisfactory evidence because these tests are 
insufficiently representative of real-world conditions. Rather than concentrating 
on the failures per se – which they acknowledge are a normal part of the learning 
process in developing a challenging technology – these BMD critics question the 
relevance of the tests as an indicator of real-world performance. The central 
issue is thus the role of similarity judgements as analysed by MacKenzie (1989) 
in his study of missile flight-testing. 
 
Concern about whether testing is sufficiently representative is at the heart of 
many technological controversies: with regulation of genetically modified crops, 
for example, hinging on ‘disputes about how to simulate realistic conditions of 
commercial use’ (Levidow, 2001, p. 866), or the safety of drugs being contested 
because ‘a great deal of uncertainty characterizes attempts to extrapolate the 
results of controlled clinical trials to future clinical practice’ (Abraham and 
Sheppard, 1999, p. 807). However, as MacKenzie (1989, pp. 413 & 415) argues: 
‘Any test, or set of tests, is always open to challenge’, and thus ‘debates about 
testing are potentially endless’. Credibility rests on similarity judgments, and 
critics can always argue that tests are insufficiently similar to real use. Whether 
such disputes occur depends on social interests, on whether there is a 
‘significant group with an interest in defeating the knowledge claims made as a 
result of an experiment or test’ (MacKenzie, 1989, pp. 415-16). 
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This would suggest a simple dichotomy in which opponents of a technology 
question the value of tests in order to dispute claims about technical feasibility 
whereas supporters are less critical. It is thus not surprising that BMD opponents 
such as the UCS have focussed on what they see as deficiencies in the testing of 
hit-to-kill technology. However, what is surprising is that some  BMD supporters 
also doubt the efficacy of the current GMD hit-to-kill system. Moreover, these 
insider critiques hinge on broader epistemic issues: disputes not just about how 
knowledge is obtained (eg whether tests are representative), but also over what 
type of knowledge is considered most credible. 
 
Specifically, the lack of operational experience with BMD technology undermines 
testing’s epistemic credibility because as Downer (2007, p.9) argues in his paper 
on jet engine testing, the credibility of tests rests on them being ‘designed to be 
representative of real-world conditions’. But with no operational use of BMD 
against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the real world must be constructed. It is 
not self-evident in nature, and instead the technology must be tested against 
likely operational scenarios in what can be seen as a virtual real world. There is 
thus a conceptual step that precedes the collection of empirical data from flight-
tests; a model of how a defence should operate must first be constructed. 
 
This weakens claims that BMD testing can, so to speak, directly interrogate 
nature. As Bloor (2005, p. 303) has put the argument in another context: ‘When 
we say we compare the model to reality we are actually comparing the model to 
a reality interpreted through the model’. Knowledge about BMD technology relies 
on deduction from theory as well as inductive inference from testing (MacKenzie 
1996). Indeed it is the battle for what Slayton (2003, p. 357) calls ‘epistemic 
authority’ between competing knowledge claims drawing on deductive and 
inductive sources that lies at the heart of debates about BMD feasibility. 
 
However, this battle over epistemic authority does not happen in a political 
vacuum. As Bloor (2011, p. 403) writes in his masterly account of the 
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development of knowledge about the aerofoil, ‘the actors involved were not 
detached intelligences moving in an abstract world of thoughts, theorems, and 
deductions.’ Knowledge claims are powerful resources, but the actors deploying 
them operate within material and political constraints. In particular, in this case 
they operate in a world of bureaucratic politics, with the bounded rationality, 
routinised behaviour, and organisational conflict and compromise that 
characterise developments in US military technology (eg Armacost, 1969; 
Sapolsky, 1972; Greenwood, 1975; Spinardi, 1994). 
 
Understanding disputes about the feasibility of the technology used in the current 
GMD system - with interceptor missiles deployed in Alaska and California – thus 
requires a historical perspective. A snapshot of just one episode in the history of 
the missile defence debate would only describe the particular knowledge claims 
about feasibility at that point, but would not explain how those beliefs came into 
existence, or how they co-evolved with the political context and technological 
developments. This paper thus follows a historical sociology approach, as used 
by MacKenzie (1990) in his study of missile guidance technology, drawing on 
interviews with some of the technology’s developers to provide the first detailed 
account of the evolution of hit-to-kill technology. Most of these interviews were 
conducted under conditions of anonymity. Some have agreed to be named, but 
others have not. All cited either worked for the Army missile defence operations 
at Huntsville, Alabama or for one of its contractors. 
 
The First Phase - 1955-75 
 
To understand the debate over the feasibility of the current GMD system we 
need to go back to when the US first began serious work on BMD technology. 
Although the development of the German V2 ballistic missile during World War II 
led to post-war US BMD research, this only began to gather pace in the mid-
1950s as the prospect of a Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) started 
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to loom large. As with the development of missiles (Armacost, 1969), there was 
inter-service rivalry over organisational control of the BMD mission, with the US 
Army winning control in 1958 (Walker et al, 2003, p. 27). 
 
Thereafter, the Army developed a system using ground-based interceptor 
missiles armed with nuclear warheads and controlled by radar. Other concepts 
for BMD were also mooted, however, and space-based approaches such as 
BAMBI (Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept) found favour within the Air Force. These 
alternative approaches had the organisational benefits of being different from 
what the Army was doing, and of potentially offering a role for the Air Force in 
missile defence. Their feasibility was examined by the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) that was set up in 1958 in the aftermath of the launch of 
the Soviet Sputnik satellite.  
 
ARPA was not convinced. Jack Ruina, ARPA Director 1961-1963, later recalled: 
‘I always thought that it was a looney idea. I don’t know why we continued it … 
BAMBI brought in all the nuts out of the woodwork’ (Barber, 1975, p. V-19). 
Nevertheless, the basic idea behind BAMBI was influential, and the conflict 
between those who supported such space-based approaches (originally aligned 
with the Air Force) and those who preferred ground-based interceptors, as 
developed by the Army, would shape the development of BMD technologies over 
the following decades. 
 
This long-standing dispute hinges on the perceived challenges and benefits of 
each approach. The key feature of space-based BMD is that in principle it can 
intercept missiles soon after they take off, in their boost phase while the rocket 
boosters are still burning. This has the great advantage that the payload of 
multiple warheads and decoys has not yet been released. It thus appears to 
solve one of the major challenges of BMD – how to discriminate warheads from 
decoys during their flight outside the atmosphere where objects of different 
weight travel at the same speed. However, the boost phase only lasts three or 
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four minutes, making timely execution of such a defence extremely challenging. 
Moreover, spaced-based BMD systems need to be within reach of their targets, 
but because satellites (other than those in the geosynchronous orbit at about 
36000 km altitude) move across the earth’s surface, it would be extremely 
expensive to put sufficient such systems into orbit.  
 
By contrast, the Army approach of ground-based interceptors relied on 
midcourse interception, carried out during the approximately twenty minutes that 
intercontinental range missile warheads travel above the atmosphere, and does 
not face such extreme time constraints. However, the challenge for midcourse 
interception is that light-weight decoys can in principle be designed to mimic the 
radar profile of the reentry vehicles that carry nuclear warheads, thus posing a 
critical problem of discrimination. 
 
The significance of these differing concepts of missile defence is that the dispute 
about their in-principle advantages has been a persistent influence on the way 
that BMD technology has been developed. Although the Army won the initial 
political battle, space-based advocates continued to challenge the consensus 
around ground-based midcourse interception. Interests formed around 
organisational allegiances based on the different BMD concepts, though it was 
only the Army, with its mandate to develop anti-missile technology, that could 
back up conceptual claims with empirical evidence. 
 
The Origins of Strategic Hit-to-Kill Technology 
 
The Army’s ground-based, nuclear-armed Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology 
was deployed in the Safeguard system in 1975, but this was cancelled almost 
immediately (Spinardi, 2010). Although testing was considered to have 
demonstrated success in intercepting target reentry vehicles, doubts about 
overall system effectiveness, along with the negotiation with the Soviet Union of 
 9 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (allowing only limited deployment), made 
Safeguard politically unsustainable. A particular concern was its use of nuclear 
warheads - designed to disable enemy warheads with the radiation they emitted. 
These were necessary because command guidance using ground-based radar 
could not get the interceptors close enough to enemy reentry vehicles for 
conventional explosives to be effective. However, not only did the use of nuclear-
armed interceptors contribute to local political opposition to their basing, but they 
also raised operational concerns. Nuclear detonations were expected to produce 
radar black-out in which portions of the sky would be rendered opaque to radar. 
This was a particular problem for Safeguard because each site had only one 
radar to control all its defensive missiles, and its effectiveness could therefore be 
quickly degraded as a result of nuclear detonations. 
 
If feasible, a non-nuclear approach to missile defence thus had attractions both 
politically and operationally. The key requirement was better guidance and one 
possible approach was to use homing techniques based on semiconductor 
materials sensitive to infrared radiation. The potential of long-wave infrared 
(LWIR) detectors had been highlighted in a 1961 paper by Henry Swift of the 
Santa Barbara Research Institute (a research organisation of the Hughes 
aerospace company). Even using the limited materials of the time (lead selenide 
and copper-doped germanium), Swift demonstrated that if cryogenically cooled 
and operated above the atmosphere these detectors could achieve very long 
detection ranges. For example, a copper doped germanium detector, when used 
with a 5 inch aperture telescope, could detect a target of 300 degrees Kelvin (i.e. 
warm room temperature) against the much colder background of space at 1300 
miles.3 
                                                 
3  Cited in Bill Davis, ‘BMD Technology Advances’, Paper presented at the 40th 
Anniversary Celebration of the US Army Space & Missile Defense, May 21, 1997. My 
thanks to Bill for providing with a copy of this paper. See also Price (2009: 245). 
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Infrared homing was considered in a wide-ranging study of promising new BMD 
approaches, known as the Newport Beach Study, carried out in 1968, and this 
led the Army’s Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency (ABMDA) to sponsor a 
further study called LORAH (Long Range Area Homing) in which four companies 
- Lockheed, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and LTV - were chosen to investigate 
optical homing (Wendell Mead interview, 29.11.06). The use of small nuclear 
warheads was still under consideration in LORAH, but a key conclusion of the 
study was that infrared homing technology could achieve sufficient accuracy to 
make their use unnecessary (Dave Montague interview, 02.03.07).  
The Homing Overlay Experiment 
 
The first attempt to demonstrate non-nuclear hit-to-kill of strategic (i.e. 
intercontinental) warheads started in 1976 in the Homing Overlay Experiment 
(HOE) (GAO, 1994, p. 8). This drew on another programme, the Designating 
Optical Tracker (DOT) initiated the year before, that culminated in five flight tests 
between 1978 and 1982 and was reported to have ‘demonstrated that a LWIR 
sensor could discriminate, designate and track a reentry vehicle’ (Walker et al, 
2003, p. 90). The Army sought authorisation for HOE from Secretary of the Army 
John Walsh, whose initial reaction was sceptical. Given that the previous BMD 
technology, Safeguard, had required the use of nuclear warheads with a lethal 
radius of about a mile, it seemed implausible that the Army now claimed to be 
able to achieve a direct hit. Bill Davis, then Deputy Director of ABMDA, recalled that 
‘it was kind of a hard sell because it’s counter-intuitive. We were using big 
nuclear warheads. All of a sudden we don’t have to use any warhead’ (Interview, 
29.11.06). Walsh insisted that a further year’s simulation work be done to confirm 
the credibility of hit-to-kill, before agreeing to authorise HOE (Davis interview, 
26.10.08). 
 
Lockheed won the competition for HOE in August 1978 based on a bid that 
emphasised the use of existing technology where possible – Lockheed’s HOE 
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programme manager, Dave Montague, recalled that their proposal claimed ’85% 
flight proven hardware’ (Interview, 29.11.06). HOE was thus not so much about 
technology development as technology demonstration: ‘We put together for the 
experiment … piece parts that we [had] in our arsenal … without having to invent 
new machinery beyond … the crucial piece, the optical sensor and the 
mechanism that controlled that sensor in the air’ (GAO, 1994, p. 31). The only 
significant areas that required new technology were the infrared sensor, its 
associated cooling system, and the guidance system. 
 
Given that HOE was intended to demonstrate something that had not been done 
before (and many doubted was possible) it made sense to over-design key 
capabilities. In particular, the aperture of the infrared telescope exceeded that 
indicated by simulations: ‘you can calculate what the infrared signature’s going to 
be but if you doing an experiment to prove something you just go a little bigger 
and collect more photons and be sure you’re going to achieve your main 
objective’ (Interview, 29.11.06). In fact, HOE was able to see reentry vehicles at 
distances of hundreds of miles. The popular way of describing its capabilities in 
unclassified terms was that: ‘We could see a normal ice cube out of a refrigerator 
at 75 miles’ (Interview, 29.11.06). 
 
One of the key choices to be made for an infrared homing interceptor is the 
semiconductor material used for the focal plane detector. The main alternatives 
are silicon and mercury cadmium telluride (also known as Mercad Telluride). 
Silicon has a number of major advantages and one big disadvantage. Its greater 
sensitivity (it has a higher ‘noise equivalent radiance’) gives longer acquisition 
range, it detects a wider range of infrared frequencies, and it is easy to integrate 
with other silicon components. However, the one significant downside with silicon 
is that it needs to be cooled to very low temperatures to be effective in detecting 
missile reentry vehicles in their mid-course. Whereas ‘Mercad’ is effective at 
about 70 degrees Kelvin, silicon requires a temperature as low as 10 degrees 
Kelvin. At the time the availability of silicon semiconductors capable of detecting 
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the appropriate wavelengths gave it the edge (Montague interview, 29.11.06). 
Mercad was also hard to produce in sufficient quantities to give a large uniform 
focal plane. 
 
A major part of the problems with HOE development stemmed from this cooling, 
which was achieved by blow down in which a cold gas is blown onto the focal 
plane. Typically this is done by expanding a suitable liquid (such as liquid helium 
or nitrogen) through a small aperture to produce the Joule Thomson effect. In 
HOE this used liquid helium to achieve low enough temperatures and even then 
the system could not do this on the fly during launch countdown and so cooling 
had to be done on the ground prior to launch. 
 
The HOE programme manager described the testing approach as ‘fly a little, 
learn a little’, with the three main aims of HOE being to determine whether the kill 
vehicle could see the target with infrared detectors, and if so, could it get close to 
it, and if so, could it kill it (Interview, 29.11.06). In order to enhance the probability 
of a kill, HOE incorporated an unfurlable umbrella-like structure (see Figure 1). 
Four flight tests were planned with the target reentry vehicle launched on a 
missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and the HOE interceptor 
launched from Kwajalein in the Pacific. Initially the ‘fly a little, learn a little’ 
approach was considered successful because useful information was learned 
from flight-tests despite their overall failure. However, this approach came under 
strain after the first two tests failed to hit the target.  
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Figure 1. Homing Overlay Experiment Test Vehicle. Photograph reproduced with 
permission of the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution. 
 
The first flight-test on 7 February 1983 failed due to insufficient cooling of the 
infrared sensor. Although stainless steel piping had been specified for the 
ground-based helium supply system, plastic-lined hose had been substituted as 
a cost-saving measure with the consequence that ambient air molecules 
contaminated the helium. When blow-down was initiated, the contaminants froze 
reducing the cooling efficiency so that the desired focal plane temperature was 
not achieved, resulting in higher sensor internal background noise at the time of 
target acquisition (Montague email, 03.11.09).  
 
The sensor still functioned sufficiently well to see the target and collect signature 
data, but because the higher focal plane temperature increased the internal 
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sensor background noise above the noise rejection threshold, the track file 
algorithm received too many apparent objects and so no track files were initiated 
and the sensor did not lock on and activate homing. Ironically, the target was 
much brighter than expected, but it was simply good fortune that the target 
remained in the sensor’s field of vision and thus allowed useful data to be 
collected (Montague interview, 11.05.06 and email, 03.11.09). 
 
The second HOE flight test, on 28 May 1983, also missed due to the failure of a 
guidance system solid-state device, but again provided signature data. The 
interceptor did successfully acquire the target before this failure and so overall 
the test was considered a ‘successful failure’ by the HOE team, although this 
view was not shared by the Army’s hierarchy. When the HOE project leader 
reported how much they had learned from this test the response was less 
enthusiastic and to the point: ‘If you didn’t hit the target, you’s a failure’ (Interview, 
29.11.06). 
 
The third test on 15 December 1983 also missed, but for a different reason 
again. The software used for the guidance algorithms contained a flaw that 
inhibited the initiation of the tracking algorithm if the launch command occurred 
during a particular portion of the airborne computer’s cycle time. Although the 
missile flew out perfectly and the seeker acquired the target, homing guidance 
was not initiated (Montague interview, 11.05.06 and email, 03.11.09). However, 
finally, with the credibility of the programme at stake the fourth HOE flight test on 
10 June 1984 achieved a direct hit.  
 
Although the public perception at the time was that HOE was part of Reagan’s 
Star Wars programme, this was true only in the sense that the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), initiated following Reagan’s famous speech of March 23, 1983, 
had taken on overall management of ballistic missile defence efforts. HOE was 
an Army programme, and many of the Army’s missile defence experts were 
doubtful of Reagan’s apparent aspirations for a perfect shield. However, the 
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wider scepticism that greeted Reagan’s desire for a defence that would make 
nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’ led to HOE being viewed by many as a 
public relations exercise to bolster SDI funding. 
 
This led to criticism of HOE by BMD opponents on the grounds that a single test 
success, against one reentry vehicle, with prior warning and no counter-
measures, did not demonstrate the feasibility of a nation-wide defence against 
thousands of Soviet reentry vehicles. This of course was not the intention of 
HOE’s developers whose aim was to determine whether the fundamental 
technical challenges of hit-to-kill could be overcome. Indeed, the Army press 
conference the day after the successful test emphasised the experimental rather 
than operational nature of the technology: ‘It’s clearly an experiment to see what 
we could get from this seeker that we built’ (GAO, 1994, p. 30). The following 
April SDI Director Abrahamson described HOE in Senate testimony as ‘an 
experiment that was built on technology and investment that was started a long 
time ago. It was certainly not weaponized’ (GAO, 1994, p. 32). 
 
Further criticism emerged later when, on 18 August 1993, before a 
Congressional debate on missile defence, the New York Times published an 
article entitled ‘Lies and Rigged “Star Wars” Test Fooled the Kremlin, and 
Congress’. This argued that the HOE test had been rigged because the target 
warhead carried a beacon that aided interception by providing location data to 
the defence (Weiner, 1993a). Missile defence supporters countered by pointing 
out that the beacon was required for range safety radar tracking and was not 
receivable by the interceptor. The beacon simply provided early flight information 
to a radar in Hawaii to enable it to provide a sufficiently accurate trajectory for the 
HOE missile’s initial flight path (GAO, 1994, p. 21).  
 
The New York Times then argued that the infrared homing was rigged because 
the target warhead was artificially heated prior to launch (Weiner, 1993b). This 
heating to 100 degrees Fahrenheit, done for all of the HOE tests, was not 
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disputed, but its significance was. It meant that the targets were around 14% 
warmer than they would otherwise have been, but the infrared signatures were 
still within the range that could be expected from Soviet targets (GAO, 1994, p. 
27).  Responding in a letter to the New York Times (but not published) Dave 
Montague of Lockheed argued that this heating ensured that all target warheads 
had a known initial temperature, and the ‘difference in visibility to the HOE sensor 
caused by the pre-heating was negligible’ because ‘the added temperature 
dissipated rapidly during flight’ as demonstrated by the fact that the target 
temperature at the time of acquisition by the interceptors on all flights was within 
1.5 degrees of unheated targets on later flights.4 A much greater contribution to 
increasing the infrared signatures of the target warheads came from the use of a 
broadside rather than head-on intercept angle , something that the Army certainly 
had done to enhance the test’s chances of success (GAO, 1994, p. 27). 
Nevertheless, a Pentagon inquiry ordered by Defense Secretary Les Aspin 
concluded that ‘the experiment was not rigged’ (Schmitt, 1993).5 
 
Although allegations of deception lingered on amongst BMD opponents (eg 
Mitchell, 2001), a more typical view was that the HOE test success reflected a 
genuine technological achievement. However, it was a demonstration of 
technical feasibility, not military capability. It showed what could be achieved in a 
flight-test, but not necessarily what could be done in an operational context. In 
                                                 
4  Letter from Dave Montague to New York Times, 3 September 1993. Quoted in AIM 
Report, September 1993, www.aim.org/publications/aim_report/1993/09b.html, accessed 
18/1/08. 
5  There was also a HOE deception programme that was intended to set off an explosion 
if the interception flew by without hitting the target with the aim of convincing the Soviet 
Union that the test had been a success. However, this programme had been terminated by 
the time of the successful fourth HOE test. See GAO (1994). The deception equipment 
was installed on the first two tests but was not used because neither passed close enough 
to the target for the deception to be effective. 
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particular, HOE was not integrated into a missile defence system and did not 
demonstrate any discrimination of the target from decoys. Nevertheless, the 
signature data collected by the HOE and DOT programmes convinced HOE’s 
developers that discrimination was feasible.  
 
Hit-to-kill supporters could now point to empirical evidence supporting their 
claims to epistemic authority. However, not all BMD supporters were convinced. 
Space-based BMD advocates did not argue the tests were rigged, but instead 
focussed on in-principle knowledge claims, particularly as regards the challenge 
of dealing with the large numbers of Soviet warheads. The deployment of MIRV 
(multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle) technology meant each ICBM 
could carry several warheads, and thousands of Soviet warheads would need 
even more (to allow for unreliability) US interceptors to counter them. Logic, 
therefore, pointed to the virtues of interception before the warheads could be 
released, and thus to space-based systems that could be used ‘to break up 
massive Soviet attacks in the boost-phase’ (Davis, 1991, p. 3). Whether HOE 
worked in a narrow, technical sense was thus irrelevant as space-based BMD 
advocates argued that only their approach could work in a military sense. 
‘Star Wars’ 
 
This meant that although the successful HOE test had apparently favourable 
timing, coming a year after President Reagan’s March 1983 Star Wars speech, it 
did not fit into the space-based vision of BMD that dominated SDI. Reagan may 
have been partly motivated by the administration’s political problems, with 
concern over the growing strength of the Nuclear Freeze movement (Fitzgerald, 
2000), but his speech also tapped into growing support for space-based 
weapons and futuristic technologies (such as lasers and particle beams). At the 
heart of this new vision for BMD was an old idea - that of boost phase 
interception of enemy missiles. 
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The preoccupation with boost-phase defence meant the Reagan administration 
was lukewarm in its response to the HOE success, even while trumpeting the 
interception as demonstrating the feasibility of missile defence. Although 
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger noted the significance of HOE by 
saying ‘it will stand as one of the cornerstones upon which the president’s 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will be built’ (quoted in Munn, 1987, p. 43), this 
transpired not to be the case. The shift of emphasis was clear, as recalled by 
Weinberger in his memoirs where he noted ‘the strong desire we had not to let 
the programme sink back into a familiar mode of solely ground-based, largely 
ineffective, defensive systems’ (Weinberger, 1990, p. 221). 
 
Hit-to-kill technology still continued. The Exo-atmospheric Reentry Interceptor 
Subsystem (ERIS) programme was established in July 1984, with Lockheed 
chosen as the contractor in 1985 (Walker et al, 2003, p. 114). However, between 
fiscal years 1985 and 1993 ERIS would receive only about half the funding 
allocated to space-based interceptors and less than a fifth of that spent on 
directed energy weapons (GAO, 1993, pp. 36-37). 
 
Whereas HOE sought to demonstrate feasibility, ERIS was ‘meant to be a 
working weapon rather than a research tool’ (Broad, 1991). HOE had stood alone 
as a proof of principle, but ERIS was integrated into a defensive concept based 
around the prevailing thinking of SDI. With the Soviet missile threat comprising 
thousands of warheads it was argued that an interceptor such as ERIS must be 
economical if sufficient were to be procured. According to the ERIS programme 
manager, ERIS was ‘only a very cheap – if I can use that word – version of what 
HOE was. The name of the game is to make it affordable’ (quoted in Reiss, 1992, 
p. 120). 
 
Even more significantly, SDI favoured the use of space-based systems, and 
crucially ERIS was designed to rely on external sensors (including ‘Brilliant Eyes’ 
satellites with infrared sensors) for discrimination and to put the interceptor on to 
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the correct trajectory. In this defensive concept the interceptor ‘would be guided 
towards the target by the external sensor (e.g. Brilliant Eyes) and would be told 
which object in its field of view is the actual target’ (GAO, 1992, p. 18). The 
intention was that these sensors would provide a hand-over to ERIS with at least 
one meter accuracy and that ERIS itself would be a relatively ‘dumb interceptor’ 
(Interview, 29.11.06). 
 
This meant that ERIS did not need such a long-range sensor as HOE, allowing a 
change in technology, with Mercad rather than silicon used for the focal plane. 
Consequently, the operating temperature did not need to be so low and liquid 
nitrogen rather than troublesome helium could be used for the cooling system. In 
addition, the sensor did not need to be pre-cooled as a sufficiently low 
temperature could be achieved by blow-down during flight. 
 
The first ERIS test on 28 January 1991 was described as ’an unqualified 
success’, with the interceptor hitting the target warhead between two balloon type 
decoys (Broad, 1991). Because adequate space-based sensors such as Brilliant 
Eyes were not yet deployed (and still were not twenty years later), the hand-over 
function was simulated by the use of Global Positioning System satellites which 
provided the tracking information to direct the interceptor towards the threat 
cluster. Similarly, with no external sensors capable of discrimination available the 
interceptor was pre-programmed to select the middle of three objects that 
comprised a dummy reentry vehicle with a balloon decoy on either side of it. The 
interceptor was able to see these objects with its infrared sensor and accordingly 
manoeuvred to hit the middle one (GAO, 1992, pp. 22-23). However, a later 
investigation by the General Accounting Office deemed that claims that the kill 
vehicle carried out successful discrimination were over-stated. The kill vehicle 
simply followed its instructions to hit the middle object, but did not do so by 
choosing the appropriate infrared signature, and if a decoy had mistakenly ended 
up in the middle, the kill vehicle would have hit that instead (GAO, 1992, p. 23). 
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A second, more ambitious test was carried out on 13 March 1992. As well as 
attempting to intercept the target, the test was also designed to demonstrate the 
interceptor’s ability to use one-colour (i.e. one frequency band) infrared 
signatures to distinguish between the target and a decoy, and to collect two-
colour infrared data by tracking the decoy balloon. The test was designed so that 
the target reentry vehicle and decoy would initially be close together, appearing 
as one object to the interceptor when it first detected them. As the interceptor 
closed on the target cluster the reentry vehicle and decoy would resolve into two 
objects and the interceptor was programmed to select the object with the lowest 
infrared signature (the cooler object, the reentry vehicle). The interceptor then 
used a pre-programmed amount of time to collect two-colour infrared data on 
both objects before attempting to intercept the target. The amount of time 
allocated for tracking the decoy, and therefore the amount that would be left for 
the intercept to home onto the target, was based on the rate of separation 
between reentry vehicle and decoys seen in previous tests. Unfortunately, in this 
test the decoy deployed much faster than before and by the time the interceptor 
switched its attention to the target, it had too little time left to achieve the 
necessary divert with the result that it missed (GAO, 1992, pp. 24-26 and 
Interview 29.11.06). 
 
ERIS was one element of a deployment plan set out by SDI in the 1987 Strategic 
Defense System Phase 1. This envisaged a layered defence with both space and 
ground-based interceptors intended to counter some of the Soviet ballistic missile 
threat – it was not the impervious shield that Reagan had originally hoped for - 
but even then SDI had difficulty producing an affordable implementation plan 
(Fitzgerald, 2000, pp. 406-7). The Soviet missile threat was simply too great to 
be countered by any defence that the US Congress was prepared to pay for.  
 
Recognising this political reality, and the changes occurring in the Soviet Union, 
some BMD supporters – including Republican Senators Warner, Cohen, and 
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Lugar (Schmitt, 1991) – suggested that SDI begin with a more modest ground-
based interceptor deployment. SDI resisted such proposals (Davis, 1991, p. 2): 
 
The Phase I architecture, the centerpiece of the program for 
four years, was defended by the program office and the 
administration far after it’s [sic] credibility as a defense 
against a massive Soviet attack had evaporated. … 
congressional initiatives for a more modest first step were 
met by a stone wall of politically damaging defiance within 
the administration, largely based on the fear that a smaller 
first step may be the last step. … The fear of a more limited 
initial defense has fed on the presumption that the 
deployment of space-based weapons, the key element in the 
Phase I architecture and the symbol of Star Wars 
legitimacy, may never gain political acceptance if it were 
not a part of the first step … 
 
However, although the threat was about to change dramatically with the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, partly undermining the rationale for boost-phase interception, 
the BMD concept would continue to reflect SDI’s space-based emphasis. 
Post-Cold War Missile Defence 
 
Announced by President Bush in his January 1991 State of the Union speech, 
SDI’s post-Cold War vision for strategic BMD, known as Global Protection 
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), had a ‘continued insistence on early 
deployment of space-based weapons’ (Davis, 1991, p. 3). The rationale for 
GPALS was to provide protection against up to 200 reentry vehicles launched 
from anywhere in the world, either from rogue states or from accidental launches 
(with particular concern about the former Soviet Union’s arsenal). A key 
technology, strongly favoured by new SDI Director Henry Cooper,6 was the 
Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor system. Ground-based interceptors 
                                                 
6  Cooper was SDI Director from July 1990 to January 1993, but had earlier carried out a 
review of BMD policy for the Bush administration in which he recommended the shift to 
GPALS. 
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(GBIs), designed to counter both strategic and theatre threats, were also 
included, but did not receive high-level advocacy as Cooper believed that 
‘because of the global coverage of such space systems, it was clear that Brilliant 
Pebbles would be the lowest cost and the most militarily effective means of 
defending both the United States and our overseas troops, friends and allies’ 
(Cooper, 2000). 
 
Rather than deploy an ERIS-based GBI, SDI’s preference was for a competitor 
technology known as LEAP (lightweight exo-atmospheric projectile) because 
Cooper’s preoccupation with space-based BMD engendered a belief that smaller 
was better, and they therefore ‘wanted to work on teeny, tiny kill vehicles’ 
(Montague interview, 11.05.06). While announcing the success of the first ERIS 
flight test, SDI was already talking about a future interceptor the size of a 
‘breadbox’ (McMahon, 1997, p. 94). LEAP took the obsession with small size to 
extremes, with kill vehicles weighing as little as thirteen pounds (GAO, 1992, p. 
27). However, to get this small size required exotic materials and ‘a watch 
maker’s job’, making LEAP expensive and unsuitable for production in large 
quantities (Interview, 29.11.06). Support for ERIS development was thus 
undermined because ‘there was still this competition amongst the technology 
people and the various groups as to whether ERIS was the way to go or whether 
LEAP was the way to go or whether we needed to start all over’ (Interview, 
29.11.06). In the end, the latter course was chosen, with neither ERIS nor LEAP 
remaining in development by the Army.7  
 
In May 1991 Cooper testified that he believed that GPALS could form ‘the basis 
for common ground regarding SDI with the Congress, our allies and friends, and 
the Soviets’ (quoted in McMahon, 1997, p. 97). This proved not to be the case, 
                                                 
7  The LEAP technology was transferred to the Navy in 1993 and formed the basis for the 
development of the Terrier/LEAP programme which evolved into the exo-atmospheric 
interceptor now based on Aegis ships (Walker et al, 2003, p. 123). 
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but common ground was developing in Congress, albeit around a technological 
approach different from that favoured by Cooper. This marked a turning point in 
BMD history with Congress making a decisive shift away from the space-based 
vision favoured by SDI, and towards concrete plans for deployment of hit-to-kill 
GBIs. 
 
The use of the short-range Patriot defensive missile against Iraqi Scuds in the 
1991 Gulf conflict proved a key development. Republican missile defence 
supporters in Congress moved to build a consensus around two ‘lessons’ that 
were seen to bolster the argument for BMD (McMahon, 1997, pp. 106-07). First, 
without Patriot, US forces, as well as allies, would have had no protection from 
Iraq’s Scud missiles. Second, the fact that Saddam Hussein had used these 
missiles against US forces, and also against Israel, showed that deterrence could 
not be relied on, an especially worrying thought if combined with Iraq’s nuclear 
ambitions. 
 
Although claims about Patriot’s effectiveness in the first Gulf War were strongly 
disputed (Postol, 1991/92), these arguments had a powerful resonance for the 
general principle that it was undesirable to leave the US and its forces and allies 
defenceless. Further support came with the events of August 1991, when the 
attempted coup in the Soviet Union, followed by the start of the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, led to concerns over the effectiveness of controls of Soviet nuclear 
forces. After much compromise the 1991 Missile Defense Act was passed by 
Congress in November, and President Bush signed it into law. The main thrust of 
the Act was that the ‘Department of Defense shall develop for deployment by the 
earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology, or by 1996, a 
cost effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant BMD system’ 
(McMahon, 1997, p. 112).  
 
GBI hit-to-kill technology was now the preferred option. The successful intercepts 
achieved in HOE and ERIS showed that hit-to-kill was possible, but an 
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operational system still needed to be developed and built, and in particular the 
key issue of discrimination needed to be addressed. Although Brilliant Pebbles 
was removed from the deployment plan, the space-based sensors of the Brilliant 
Eyes (BE) satellites remained central. SDI’s July 1992 Report to Congress noted 
the role of Brilliant Eyes thus: ‘BE develops high quality tracks and provides early 
discrimination shortly after the reentry vehicles drop off the post-boost vehicle’ 
(SDIO, 1992, p. 2-10). The reliance on Brilliant Eyes thus reflected a compromise 
between ground and space -based approaches. The next generation of GBI 
would incorporate an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) design predicated on a 
concept that emphasised discrimination by spaced-based satellites. This would 
prove controversial within the hit-to-kill community, not only because of the 
organizational distaste towards spaced-based systems, but also because they 
believed on-board EKV discrimination had better prospects. 
 
EKV Development and Deployment under Clinton and G. W. Bush 
 
Initially, however, the new administration of Bill Clinton (elected at the end of 
1992) downplayed the importance of strategic BMD. On 13 May 1993 Secretary 
of Defense Aspin, announced the ‘end of the Star Wars era’, changing the name 
of the organisation in charge of missile defence from SDI to the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organisation (BMDO). With the lessons of the Gulf War in mind, the 
emphasis was now to be on theatre BMD (McMahon, 1997, p. 245). 
 
However, the midterm elections of 1994 produced a hostile Republican 
dominated Congress, resurrecting what was now termed National Missile 
Defence (NMD) as a political issue. The result was further Congressional 
legislation, the 1995 Ballistic Missile Defense Act. Like its 1991 predecessor, the 
1995 Act sought deployment of a BMD system using ground-based interceptors 
to protect the United States, with sensors both ground-based and in space. 
Unlike the earlier act, the 1995 Act specified a deployment timetable, setting 
2003 as the date for an initial operational capability. This was vetoed by Clinton, 
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but the resulting compromise led to a doubling of spending on strategic missile 
defence (Graham, 2001, p. 26). 
 
Further political pressure came with the 1998 publication of the Rumsfeld 
Commission report on ballistic missile threats from  so-called rogue states, and 
its impact was amplified by the launch of a three-stage missile by North Korea 
that August (Graham, 2001, pp. 52-69). Although the missile did not in itself 
constitute much of a threat to the US mainland, it did indicate that North Korea 
was making progress in missile development, and even more significantly to 
some, that US intelligence agencies could not be relied on to predict potential 
threats. 
 
Meanwhile EKV work continued. After a number of mergers between companies, 
the final competition was between teams from Boeing (formerly Rockwell) and 
Raytheon (formerly Hughes). A key difference between the two centred on the 
choice of focal plane material, with Boeing using the same silicon approach as 
HOE, whereas Raytheon took the ERIS approach of using Mercad Telluride. 
During the contest Boeing highlighted a graph that stressed the advantages of 
silicon’s greater sensitivity over a wider range of frequencies: ‘They [Boeing] 
would show that - that was always their big curve, went out to 20 and showed 
Mercad cutting off at 12 - when they were selling silicon’ (Interview, 29.11.06). 
This meant that silicon offered longer acquisition range, which in turn, meant that 
the EKV could be lined up with the target earlier and so needed to carry less 
propulsion for diverts. However, this weight advantage could be outweighed by 
the challenge of cooling the silicon focal plane to the required 10 degrees Kelvin 
(Interview, 29.11.06). Nevertheless, the Boeing design was still simpler than 
Raytheon’s which used three separate focal planes to detect different 
wavelengths, and thus required plumbing to cool each of these individually. 
 
In the end the perceived qualities of the two firm’s different EKV designs would 
not decide the competition, which was abruptly curtailed in December 1998 when 
 26 
Raytheon was awarded the contract ‘after Boeing disclosed to the government 
that employees of its EKV team had obtained and misused proprietary 
information developed by the other EKV competitor, Raytheon’ (GAO, 2003a, p. 
2; see also Graham, 2001, pp. 181-185). Raytheon thus got the EKV job by 
default (see Figure 2).  
 
 27 
 
 28 
 
Figure 2: The Raytheon Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle. Photograph reproduced 
with permission of the US Missile Defense Agency. 
 
What had been a small technology readiness project now became a high profile 
development programme, and Raytheon’s inexperienced team struggled to 
produce an EKV suitable for flight-testing (Graham, 2001, p. 186). Nevertheless 
the first flight-test on October 2, 1999 – with an EKV said to be about 120 pounds 
in weight and four feet long (Broad, 1999) - achieved a direct hit, albeit somewhat 
fortuitously.8 However, the following two tests both failed to hit the target (Becker, 
2000). In the first the sensor failed to cool sufficiently, probably due to faulty 
plumbing, and in the second the EKV failed to separate from the booster 
(Sciolino, 2000b; Graham, 2001, pp. 301-02). With the maturity of the technology 
unproven, Clinton was able to defer the deployment decision to the next US 
president (Schmitt, 2000). 
 
Whereas Clinton had at best been lukewarm, the election of George W. Bush 
saw a shift towards deployment. The hit-to-kill technology of the NMD program - 
renamed as the Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) - now became the 
mainstay of US missile defence plans. The Bush administration was determined 
to press ahead quickly and GMD testing became geared towards development 
and deployment rather than demonstrating feasibility. The Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA), as BMDO was renamed, adopted a capability-based approach. 
That is to say, MDA began deployment of the best available technology more or 
less regardless of test results. Indeed, a series of failures meant that no flight-
tests were carried out between October 2002 and September 2006 (Spinardi, 
2008). 
 
                                                 
8  The EKV initially drifted off course and locked on to a decoy balloon rather than the 
target warhead. See Sciolino (2000a). 
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The original plan for a system based at the old Safeguard site in North Dakota 
(and thus compliant with the ABM Treaty) proved unworkable politically because 
missiles based there could not provide complete protection of the most western 
Aleutian Islands off Alaska or two uninhabited Hawaiian islands (Graham, 2001, 
pp. 123-26). This mattered because the Republican Senator Ted Stevens of 
Alaska was the chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Defence, and Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii was the ranking democrat 
on that subcommittee (Gordon and Myers, 2000). In order to achieve complete 
coverage a long-burn booster was chosen to launch the EKV, a design choice 
that was compatible with the EKV’s short viewing range. 
 
This was seen as appropriate because the design of the EKV was predicated on 
the availability of space-based infrared discrimination. This technical choice 
reflected the space-based bias of the Star Wars era and the expectation that 
space-based sensors would provide high quality target data, thus reducing the 
need for the interceptor to have a long time to view the target. The idea was that 
‘we’re going to have this satellite that’s going to tell you very accurately: a. what 
the target is and b. where it is. So you can look through a soda straw and you 
don’t have to start looking until it’s perhaps 100 kilometers away, as opposed to 
close to a thousand’ (Montague interview, 11.05.06 and email, 03.11.09).  
 
As it turned out, these space-based sensors were delayed, with the SBIRS-High 
programme (the successor to Brilliant Eyes) suffering technical problems and 
cost and schedule overruns (GAO, 2003b; Smith, 2005). The first satellite was 
finally launched in May 2011, but until a complete system is deployed and tested 
the GMD system must rely on discrimination using target data from a 
combination of ground-based radar and the EKV’s own infrared sensor. By 2011 
30 GMD interceptor missiles had been deployed (26 based in Alaska and 4 in 
California), but serious doubts remain about the operational effectiveness of this 
technology. 
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Of the 16 attempted intercept tests of the EKV technology up to 2010, only 8 
were described as fully successful. One failed attempt was dubbed a no test 
because the failure of the target to deploy properly meant that the interceptor 
was not launched, there was one failure of the EKV to cool properly, in two cases 
the interceptors failed to take off at all, and in two other cases the EKV failed to 
separate from the missile. The latest two tests in January and December 2010 
both failed to hit the target, with the first miss attributed to a radar problem 
(Coyle, 2010) and the latter failure reason as yet undisclosed.9 
Testing, Design Choices, and the Debate over GMD Feasibility 
 
The current GMD system has been shaped in part by the space-based bias of 
the SDI era, in part by the political necessity to protect all US territory (including 
Hawaii), and in part by the circumstances that disqualified Boeing from the 
competition for the EKV contract. It has proved politically sustainable (the Obama 
administration continued its deployment), but many critics continue to question its 
technical feasibility, not least because of its middling flight-test record. 
 
These critics can point to a flight-test success rate of only 50% hitting the target. 
The most recent test failure in December 2010 led the MDA to suspend EKV 
production, pending the results of reviews and further tests (O’Reilly, 2011). 
Although the 1984 HOE intercept showed that hit-to-kill was feasible in test 
conditions, subsequent testing has not yet produced a consensus that this can 
be achieved consistently or in real-world conditions. 
 
Many critics of the GMD system, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
argue that not only have the flight-tests not achieved sufficiently good results to 
justify deployment, but also that they have been insufficiently similar to 
operational use. Any inference of real-world performance is therefore unjustified. 
                                                 
9  The system was reported to have functioned perfectly until the last 20 seconds of EKV 
flight, but what went wrong has not been reported. See Butler, 2011. 
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Central to the real-world capability of the GMD system is the ability of the EKV to 
discriminate warheads from decoys, but many question whether this is possible, 
and argue that the flight-tests that have been carried out do not demonstrate 
such a capability.  
 
For example, the UCS argues that the tests of the NMD/GMD technology have 
been insufficiently realistic because they have been carried out over a limited 
number of intercept trajectories, without much variation in the position of the sun, 
against unchallenging or no countermeasures, and with prior knowledge of the 
nature and timing of the attack (Gronlund et al, 2004). This criticism thus focuses 
on similarity judgements (MacKenzie, 1989) about whether the tests were 
sufficiently similar to operational use. 
 
However, this history of hit-to-kill technology shows that doubts about GMD 
feasibility are not restricted to BMD opponents, and do not just hinge on this 
matter of inference from test results. Instead, two groups of BMD supporters also 
doubt GMD feasibility, though for markedly different reasons. Moreover, their 
doubts revolve around a dispute about epistemic authority deriving from differing 
types of knowledge claims. 
 
Supporters of space-based BMD have always claimed epistemic authority on the 
basis of deduction from conceptual analysis (no such systems have reached the 
stage of flight-testing). This space-based BMD lobby supports the deployment of 
missile defences, but argues that midcourse hit-to-kill is the wrong approach in 
principle. They argue, for example, that ‘GMD is a limited midcourse defense that 
will be effective against only a few missiles with simple decoys. Because GMD 
cannot adequately discriminate among midcourse threats, it may be prone to 
failure unless it becomes part of a layered missile defense’ (Independent 
Working Group, 2006. p. 15). Supporters of space-based BMD thus continue to 
advocate a satellite-based system for boost-phase interception. 
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In contrast, some supporters of ground-based hit-to-kill BMD also criticise the 
current GMD system, but base their knowledge claims about feasibility on both 
conceptual and empirical grounds. These critics comprise many with direct 
experience of early hit-to-kill development (such as HOE and DOT) who believe 
that the implementation of hit-to-kill technology in the GMD design has been 
undermined by reliance on space-based sensors for discrimination. Their claims 
to epistemic authority thus derive from their hands-on experience with developing 
and testing hit-to-kill technology.  
 
The central objection of these critics is not that GMD flight-testing is 
unrepresentative (although they would endorse more challenging tests), but 
rather that the effectiveness of the technology has been undermined by the 
adoption of an operational model based on the use of satellite sensors to provide 
discrimination. These critics lament the fact that the emphasis on space-based 
sensors means that the GMD programme has not built on the infrared data 
collected from earlier tests, including HOE and DOT, and that discontinuation of 
this work meant that ‘expertise was lost’ (NRC 2012, p. 131). As a consequence: 
‘Forty years of optical signature data from well-instrumented past and recent 
flight tests are lying fallow and unanalyzed with respect to current technological 
capabilities’ (NRC 2012, p. 12).  
 
The key concern is that the EKV has been designed to have too short a viewing 
time because of its limited range infrared sensor and the long-burn time of the 
rocket boosters used to launch it. A short viewing time has two main 
consequences. It means less time for the EKV sensor to gather signature data 
that might enable discrimination, and it also limits the ‘battle space’ as regards 
the defence having a second chance should the first intercept attempt fail. The 
lack of time is critical because the potential for discrimination depends on the 
ability of the EKV to watch target objects as their infrared signatures change as 
they pass through varying conditions. As the Lockheed manager of the HOE 
programme puts it: ‘Time is the key discriminant because everything varies with 
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time’ (Montague interview, 11.05.06). Although such discrimination is very 
challenging, it is claimed that ‘Lincoln Laboratory … has worked out some very 
powerful algorithms that are based … on the thermodynamics of looking at the 
body, but it takes a while - you can’t do it with the EKV in ten seconds’ (Davis 
interview, 29.11.06). 
 
Given time it is argued that the EKV (if it has sufficient sensor range) can view 
the target and carry out discrimination because of the changing thermodynamic 
behaviour of objects as they move through differing conditions of incident 
radiation (for example, moving between night and day and moving over land or 
ocean). As ambient radiation changes, lighter weight objects undergo greater 
temperature shifts than heavier objects and so similar shaped objects of different 
mass, which radar cannot readily distinguish in the atmosphere-free midcourse, 
could be discriminated due their fluctuating infrared signatures. However, 
according to disgruntled hit-to-kill supporters, this on-board EKV discrimination is 
not possible in the current GMD design, and instead ‘they’re relying primarily on 
X-band radar for real discrimination because the viewing time of the kill vehicle is 
very short’ (Montague interview, 11.05.06 and email, 03.11.09). 
 
In addition to objecting to its ‘myopic’ sensor, the insider critics also regret the 
choice of a long-burn booster for the GMD system. As one put it: ‘Because 
Boeing didn’t understand the problem and they got helped by the BMDO to 
create this requirement to defend Hawaii from someplace in the United States - 
you got this humungous reach requirement that makes no sense at all’ 
(Interview, 11.05.06). The problem with this is that the ‘interceptor cannot do 
anything until it burns out and so if you’ve got this thing in a long boost its just 
eating up battle space while its trying to get to its burnout point’ (Mead interview, 
29.11.06). This means that should the interception fail there would be no time for 
a second attempt, and information obtained by a first wave of defensive 
interceptors cannot be passed to a second wave. 
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These formerly-marginalised insider critiques finally became mainstream in 2012 
with the publication of an authoritative study carried out under the auspices of the 
National Academy of Sciences in response to a Congressional request.  This 
study describes deficiencies with the current GMD system, particularly as 
regards its combination of long burn and short viewing times, and concludes that: 
‘The GMD system lacks fundamental features long known to maximize the 
effectiveness of a midcourse hit-to-kill defense capability against even limited 
threats’ (NRC 2012, p. 131). Instead the study recommends ‘a smaller, shorter 
burn interceptor’ missile with ‘a heavier, more capable kill vehicle’, and a 
combination of long viewing times (over 100 seconds) and X-ray radar data for 
discrimination. (NRC 2012, pp. 131-32). Were these recommendations to be 
accepted as policy, the tale would have come full circle, and the veterans of early 
hit-to-kill development (some of whom were authors of the study) would have 
seen their epistemic authority accepted as most credible. 
Conclusion 
 
Despite many years of development and testing, claims about the performance of 
hit-to-kill technology remain contested. A superficial analysis of this would see a 
straightforward dichotomy based on social interests. On the one hand, the MDA 
sees flight-tests as providing useful feedback on performance, with a 
commitment to conduct ‘increasingly complex flight tests to achieve more 
objectives and enhance the realism of each test’ (O’Reilly, 2011). On the other 
hand, BMD opponents argue that GMD testing has been insufficiently realistic to 
provide a guide to real-world feasibility. For example, in 2008 David Wright of the 
UCS dismissed the value of an upcoming test, arguing that: ‘Successful or not, 
this test will not prove that the missile defense system can counter real-world 
decoys’ (Wright, 2008). 
 
However, the detailed history of hit-to-kill technology described here shows that 
concerns about hit-to-kill feasibility are more complex than this. These concerns 
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are not restricted to traditional BMD opponents, but also include supporters, 
including many veterans of hit-to-kill development. For these critics the issue 
rests not on the similarity judgments involving comparison between tests and real 
world use, but also on judgments about what real world use would involve, and 
thus what comprises the best BMD system design. 
 
These judgments have intertwined with organisational allegiances to produce two 
main camps of BMD supporters: one supporting midcourse interception by 
ground-based missiles, the other aligned with space-based systems for boost-
phase interception. The lack of operational experience, the changing and 
contested nature of the threat, and the highly political (in terms of both party and 
bureaucratic politics) nature of the issue, have made closure hard to achieve, 
and often transitory. In this terrain, the historical turf-battle between the Army and 
the Air Force has evolved over the years into a battle for epistemic authority 
hinging on different types of knowledge claims.  
 
Not always obvious to the general public, this dispute over epistemic authority 
has been central to the evolution of US BMD technology. Space-based 
advocates had their day in the 1980s with Reagan’s Star Wars, but over the last 
two decades the pendulum has swung decisively towards advocates of ground-
based interceptors. However, some hit-to-kill old-timers were unhappy because 
they considered the technology developed – the GMD system – to be a 
compromise outcome, shaped by the politics of the Star Wars era, amongst other 
things. 
 
Whether the recent National Academy of Sciences study will settle the matter 
once and for all is open to question. The history of BMD shows protracted 
argument over more than fifty years, not just about which technological solution 
would work best, but also about what type of knowledge should carry most 
credibility. The technology of concern here – for defence against nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles – is unusual in its complete lack of operational use. Whether 
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such use would provide compelling evidence is hard to know (data collection 
might be a problem), but it is sincerely to be hoped that the need for such use 
does not occur. 
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